

(23)

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
UN ASPECTS OF CUBAN SITUATION

II

Operational Guidelines

1. We should get OAS action under the Rio Treaty (Art. 6), (presumably also at least inform NATO).

2. This action should be based on self-defense under the Charter of the UN - Art. 51.

3. The justification for this must be that the USSR has destroyed the independence of Cuba and is through its use of Cuba as a base intervening in and aggressing against the Western Hemisphere. The latest information required immediate defensive action by the OAS.

4. The OAS should report to the S.C. under Arts. 54 and 57 of the Charter of the UN (not under Art. 53X which would require SC approval).

5. At least simultaneously with OAS action and

reporting

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reporting to the S.C. the US should lay a second item on the SC agenda along the lines of paragraph 3 above and reporting under Art. 51 what steps we are taking.

6. It is highly desirable for us to ask for SC action before the USSR or Cuba do. At the same time it is not desirable to have the SC meet prior to OAS action and US implementation if we can avoid it. Exactly when we ask for an SC meeting will have to be determined according to probabilities of leaks.

7. If the USSR moves into the SC prior to an OAS meeting and US action, we should immediately respond with a counter complaint. The USSR easily could do this.

8. While ~~strong~~ "tough" action is going on directly and through the OAS, our use of the UN should be aimed at demonstrating our limited objectives and offering a political

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solution broad enough to divert attention away from the immediate military action to the long range problem.

9. Draft agenda items, memoranda, speeches, and resolutions therefore must be prepared in advance. They will differ somewhat depending on the circumstance.

10. The LA Members of the SC are Venezuela and Chile. Their support is essential. It must come from capitals.